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17.1 Introduction 
The standard ontogenic (life-cycle) model of technological evolution can be 
characterized briefly as follows (Ayres, 1987): (1) a radical invention (birth) 
creates a new technology; (2) it is commercialized on the basis of performance 
and rapidly developed by a series of improvements and modifications (in-
fancy); (3) it is successful enough in the marketplace to attract many vari-
ants and imitators who hope to exploit a growing market (adolescence); 
( 4) the pace of technological change finally slows down enough to permit 
standardization and exploitation of economies of scale, and competition on 
the basis of price rather than performance (maturity); and finally a new 
and better technology supplants it (senescence). 
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The standard model involves substitutions in the adolescent and senes-
cent stages. During the adolescent stage, the new and dynamic technology 
is gradually penetrating the markets of its predecessor. During the senes-
cent stage it, in turn, is being displaced from its markets by its successor. 
The substitution of a new technology for an older one is often modeled as 
a deterministic process, following a simple mathematical formula such as a 
logistic function or a Gompertz curve (see, for example, Linstone and Sahal, 
1976; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; Mahajan and Wind, 1986). 
However, complex social systems - including the system of innovation, 
adoption and diffusion of technology - are inherently nonlinear. As such, 
they must be expected to exhibit the characteristics of nonlinear dynamical 
systems. Among these characteristics is the occurrence of non-equilibrium 
steady-state behaviors (such as limit cycles and quasi-periodic motion) that 
temporarily emulate the behavior of simpler systems, but eventually depart 
from it (Crutchfield et ai., 1986). In short, social systems cannot be expected 
to always behave in accordance with any given simple model. Indeed, simple 
behavior, when it does occur, is likely to be an example of non-equilibrium 
steady state. Hence, from the standpoint of fundamental dynamical theory 
it seems likely that more can be learned by analyzing cases where the simple 
models fail than cases where they seem to work well (e.g., Fisher and Pry, 
1971). 
In particular, the simple deterministic substitution model that is nor-
mally assumed assumes that a substitution process, once it has proceeded 
past a certain threshold, inevitably proceeds to completion (unless it is inter-
rupted by a further substitution). This implies the existence of an underlying 
self-reinforcing (lock-in) mechanism of some sort. Such mechanisms are in-
trinsically nonlinear in nature. A number of examples have been examined 
by Arthur (1983, 1988a, and 1988b). Obviously, the large number of cases 
where the substitution process has proceeded according to this script can be 
regarded as indirect evidence of the pervasiveness of self-reinforcing mecha-
nisms. Yet, there are significant exceptions. Such a case is the subject of this 
chapter. We examine the technological evolution of fuels for spark-ignition 
internal combustion engines (e.g., automobile engines) since the beginning of 
the present century. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some possi-
ble explanations for the failure of "antiknock" additives to displace cracking 
as a means of raising gasoline octane, or conversely. 
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17.2 Historical Background 
The automobile had no single inventor. It is usually traced to early mod-
els by Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach, and Karl Benz (ca. 1885). 
For the next twenty years and more, automobiles were essentially toys for 
the rich and adventurous. It was not until after 1905 (the year Ford Motor 
Co. was founded) that automobiles were technologically developed enough 
to be useful for simple transportation purposes. Even then, for many years, 
they remained expensive, unreliable and uncomfortable. However, by 1908 
the dominant technological trajectory had been determined and the indus-
try, led by Ford, began to standardize. The enormously successful Model 
T was introduced in 1908, which symbolically marks the end of the "child-
hood" phase of the auto industry and the beginning of adolescence and 
consolidation. 
This chapter is not about autos, however, but about motor fuel. The 
relevance of the previous paragraph is simply that after 1908 demand for cars 
- and, consequently for gasoline - began to rise rapidly. It is important to 
note that in the earliest days automotive fuel was so-called natural gasoline, a 
medium volatility product of crude oil refining, consisting offractions boiling 
in the range between 0-700 C and an octane of 72-75. But this light fraction 
averages only about 2.4% (by weight) of North American crude and no more 
than 4.7% of middle-Eastern crude.[l] To increase the output of motor 
fuel, early refineries blended natural gasoline with the next heavier fraction, 
naphtha, boiling in the range 70-1400 C, but with less desirable combustion 
properties. The blend had an octane level of around 50. For North American 
crude oils the naphtha fraction averages 6.5% by weight (7.9% for middle-
Eastern crude). Thus, while local details differed, petroleum refiners in the 
USA ca. 1910 could only utilize around 9% of their crude oil, by weight, 
directly for motor fuel. 
At the time (1910),9% of the crude oil was still adequate to supply the 
automotive demand, inasmuch as there were as yet relatively few vehicles 
on the roads. Indeed, the biggest market for petroleum products was still 
illuminating oil (kerosene), which constituted about 15.6% of the weight of 
the refinery product stream. However the heavier, lower-value fractions, gas 
oil (now known as heavy distillate, diesel oil, or heating oil), and residual 
oil together still constituted 75% of the refinery output. Gas oil, alone, 
accounted for about 60% of the product. There were already significant 
incentives to add value to the heavy fractions by somehow converting them 
into lighter fractions. 
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The breakup of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (NJ) in 1911 triggered 
a major innovation, the thermal cracking process. The chief inventor and 
innovator of the process was William Burton, a vice president of one of 
the spinoffs from Standard Oil, Standard Oil Co. of Indiana (now renamed 
Amoco). With its refineries on the shores of Lake Michigan, and its major 
market the rapidly growing Chicago metropolitan area, Indiana Standard 
was faced with an exceptionally rapidly growing market area, together with a 
rather limited access to crude oil.[2] A new technology promising to increase 
the fraction of crude oil that could be used for motor fuel was very welcome. 
Burton's thermal cracking process - heating a batch of heavy gas oil 
in a closed tank or retort - effectively converted about 20% of the gas oil 
into a light fraction suitable for blending with natural gasoline and naph-
tha. This effectively doubled the output of motor gasoline from about 9% 
to around 21%, while simultaneously increasing its research octane (RON) 
rating from 50 to 55. The Burton process was first introduced in 1913-1914 
and was enormously profitable to refiners. For this reason it was rapidly 
adopted by others (Figure 17.1). It also set off a great wave of competi~ 
tive invention and innovation, since other oil companies did not like paying 
the high royalties demanded by Indiana Standard for what was, essentially 
a very simple invention. Burton and his colleagues began to improve their 
first crude batch process. Meanwhile, others entered the field with ideas for 
continuous thermal processes and (later) catalytic processes. 
Table 17.1 summarizes the major innovations in refining after 1913 and 
Figure 17.2 indicates the succession of substitutions in refinery technology in 
quantitative terms, as each technology replaced its predecessor and was, in 
turn, replaced. (Data for these exhibits has been taken primarily from Enos, 
1962, and Lakhani, 1975). It is noteworthy that the substitutions displayed 
in Figure 17.2 do seem to fit the standard ontogenic model reasonably well. 
From the standpoint of the octane industry, Burton's radical innovation 
of 1913 marks the date of birth. But, what makes this case complicated 
(and interesting) is that there were two different - and noncomplementary 
- market interests and consequently two driving forces involved. The first, 
as suggested above, was the petroleum refineries' direct economic interest 
in increasing the output of high-value motor fuel per barrel of crude oil. 
Doubling the output of motor fuel per barrel from 9% to 20-21% meant, 
in effect, that less than half the amount of crude oil had to be discovered, 
pumped, shipped, and distilled to yield the same amount of salable product. 
The second market interest - which created a demand for higher octane 
per se - was shared by the automobile users and manufacturers, but was 
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Table 17.1. Summary of major cracking technologies. 
Name 
Burton batch 
thermal 
cracking 
process, Indiana 
Standard, 
1913-1914 
Continuous tube 
fj tank thermal 
cracking process 
(Clark, ESSO, 
1922). Dubbs 
process (UOP, 
1922). Cross 
process (1922). 
Houdry fixed 
bed (batch) 
catalytic 
cracking process 
(Sun Oil, 
So cony-
Vacuum, 
1938) 
Continuous 
fluidized bed 
catalytic 
cracking process 
(ESSO et al., 
Mobil, Houdry) 
Specific economic 
advantage over 
predecessor 
Increased octane to 
about 60 and 
motor gasoline 
yield per bbl of 
petroleum from 
about 9% to 21% 
or so. 
Better suited to 
scale-up than batch 
process; increased 
octane to 72, mpg 
by 22% and output 
per unit of capital 
by 50%. Reduced 
process energy by 
20%. 
Increased gasoline 
yield to 40% of 
crude, octane to 
72. Cut process 
energy by 2/3. 
Better suited to 
scale-up than batch 
process; increased 
octane to 93-95. 
Factors driving innovation 
Indiana Standard was created by the 
court ordered breakup of Jersey 
Standard; it was left with refining and 
distribution, but little crude supply. 
Demand in Chicago area was rising 
imperative to stretch each barrel. 
ESSO wanted to invent around 
Indiana Standard's processes and to 
invalidate other patents (e.g., Cross). 
Universal Oil Products (UOP) was 
created by a group of regional refiners 
to invent around Indiana Standard's 
patents because they were unable to 
license because they were in the same 
marketing area. UOP sued Indiana 
Standard to preempt. 
Initial research in France was 
prompted by fears of shortages and 
lack of crude oil in Europe: Backing 
by Sun Oil Co. was due to a glut of 
heavy fuel oil and Sun's market niche 
with a single grade gasoline of higher 
octane than its competitors. 
Catalytic Research Associates was 
formed by Esso, with BP, Shell, 
Texaco, UOP, MW Kellogg and IG 
Farben to invent around the Houdry 
fixed bed process. Members of the 
syndicate could avoid royalties on the 
process. Mobil developed its own 
process for the same reason. 
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Figure 17.1. Cracking capacity as percent of total crude oil production 
capacity. (Source: Lakhani, 1975, p. 54.) 
to some extent contrary to the interests of the petroleum companies. The 
conflict and its resolution are part of this story. The inherent characteristics 
of internal combustion engines are such that both output power and ther-
modynamic efficiency are functions of the compression ratio of the engine. 
Thus, high compression engines offer better performance for the car. The 
compression ratio is the ratio of the volume of combustion products after 
expansion (exhaust gases) to the volume of the fuel-air mixture at the point 
of ignition. Since the exhaust gases must be at atmospheric pressure, this is 
also a measure of the amount of compression in the engine. 
For a spark-ignition engine - in contrast to a Diesel engine - the maxi-
mum compression is not limited by the geometry of the cylinder and crank-
shaft, or the tightness of the piston-rings, as might be expected, but by the 
tendency of the engine to knock or ping, which cuts power output sharply 
and can cause damage. Knocking means the octane level of the fuel being 
used is not high enough to operate at the design compression ratio. The at-
tribute that permits higher compression is called the research octane number 
or RON, or simply octane. It varies considerably from fuel to fuel, depend-
ing on its chemical structure, oxygen content and other factors. In general, 
higher octane fuels permitted higher compression engines, which permitted 
better automotive performance as well as fuel economy. Figure 17.3 shows 
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Figure 17.2. Petroleum cracking .processes. (Sources: Data prior to 1958 
from Ayres, 1987; data from 1958 on from Lakhani, 1975, p. 54.) 
the historical progression of octanes from 1930 until 1970, while Figure 17.4 
shows the close parallel with increasing engine compression ratios. 
Increasing fuel economy (due to increased octane levels) meant that gaso-
line sales in volume terms did not increase as fast as automobile usage. On 
the other hand, every increase in automotive performance attracted more 
first-time buyers of automobiles, and each additional vehicle in the fleet 
meant a guaranteed demand for gasoline throughout the life of the car. Thus, 
the petroleum industry had a somewhat contradictory interest in the octane 
race. On the one hand, as long as petroleum supplies were ample, better 
fuel economy was not in its direct economic interest. On the other hand, it 
did share the interest of the automobile manufacturers in attracting more 
and more people to buy cars, because the more cars people bought the more 
motor fuel the refiners could sell. 
This conflict between short- and long-term interests on the part of the 
petroleum refiners had one direct implication, however. Given the possibility 
of increasing octane levels independently of changes in refining technology, 
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vis-a-vis the possibility of increasing octane levels in conjunction with in-
creasing the fraction of the crude oil that could be utilized for motor fuel, the 
latter was vastly preferable for the refiners. This preference explains much 
of the history of the octane race. Of course, the technology of increasing 
octane levels independently of refinery practice was introduced in the early 
1920s. We discuss this next. 
17.3 The Introduction of Tetraethyl Lead 
The search for an antiknock additive for gasoline began in 1916, when engine 
compression ratios averaged only 4:1, yet knocking was a pervasive problem 
due to the low octane level of the motor fuels then available. At the time, 
however, the cause was not known. Charles Kettering's battery ignition sys-
tem had been introduced only a few years earlier, and rival magneto ignition 
system manufacturers blamed it for knock. To counter this ploy (and find 
the real explanation, and a solution to the problem), Kettering and his col-
leagues Thomas Midgley, Thomas Boyd, and Carroll Hochwalt launched a 
research program at his Dayton Engineering Laboratories. It was subsidized 
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Figure 17.4. Automobile engine compression ratios. 
by General Motors Corporation (GM), which later purchased Dayton Engi-
neering Labs., (now known as DELCO Division) and made Kettering Vice 
President and chief scientist. 
The first step was to test Midgley's theory that fuel volatility was the 
cause of the problem. (This had seemed plausible because increased de-
mand for motor fuel had been met by increased blending of natural gasoline 
with less volatile naphtha). Volatility was ruled out by the end of 1916. 
Next, Kettering had a hunch that fuel color[3] might have an influence on 
knocking. This was quickly tested by adding various coloring agents to the 
fuel. The color theory was quickly discarded, but one of the chemical agents 
tested was iodine, which did have a measurably beneficial effect on knock-
ing. For the next five years hundreds of compounds were tested, and some 
possible antiknock compounds were found, including aniline, selenium, and 
tellurium. They were all rejected for various reasons (such as odor). Finally, 
in December 1921, tetraethyllead (TEL) was synthesized by Hochwalt. As 
an antiknock additive it has never been equalled, despite many millions of 
dollars of subsequent research by the German chemical cartel IG Farben. 
For TEL to become a practical fuel additive, a manufacturing process 
was needed. This was developed by Charles Kraus, whose research was sup-
ported by Standard Oil Co., NJ . The GM patents on TEL and the Standard 
Oil Co., NJ manufacturing patents were consolidated by the formation of 
Ethyl Corporation in 1924, jointly owned by GM and Standard Oil Co., NJ. 
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Another problem that had to be overcome was the corrosion of spark plugs 
by lead oxide deposits. This was finally overcome by the addition of ethylene 
dichloride and ethylene dibromide in the additive. The latter, in turn, re-
quired a large and reliable source of bromine, which was finally achieved by 
the commercialization of the Dow process to extract bromine from seawater 
(1931). 
From 1924 to 1930 the Ethyl Corporation was primarily involved in R&D, 
testing, advertising and marketing premium or Ethyl gasoline and building 
up its distribution network. Meanwhile, GM was actively promoting the 
higher performance cars that the new fuel made possible. Whether for this 
reason, or others, it was during this period that GM overtook Ford as the 
major US auto manufacturer. 
Sales of TEL (in the form of ethyl fluid sold by Ethyl Corporation to 
refineries, and blended by the latter into commercial gasoline) took off. Mo-
tor fuel (gasoline) sales more than quadrupled from 1929 to 1967, with only 
a slight decline even in the worst year of the depression. Meanwhile, the 
average content of lead in grams per gallon of gasoline increased ten-fold 
and almost monotonically during the depression years (from 0.17 gm/gal. in 
1929 to 1.75 gm/gal. in 1939) and reached an all-time peak of 4.71 gm/gal. 
in the wartime year of 1944. It hovered in the 3.5-3.9 range in the late 1960s 
before the first restrictions on TEL use - for environmental reasons - became 
effective. The average lead use, per gallon of gasoline used on highways, is 
shown in Figure 17.5. 
17.4 Relative Contributions of Refining and TEL 
In terms of the life-cycle model referred to briefly at the beginning of this 
chapter, one would expect the long-term competition between refinery tech-
nology and additives (notably TEL) to result in a clear superiority of one 
over the other, resulting in a well-defined displacement or substitution pro-
cess. Before this hypothesis can be tested, however, we need a methodology 
for allocating the apparent octane added in each year (defined as octane per 
gallon above the base level of 50) among the various sources. From 1929 to 
1970, roughly, the competition was strictly between refining and TEL. Since 
the environmental constraints on TEL have been gradually implemented, a 
new set of additives - basically alcohols - have appeared on the scene. These 
will be discussed later. 
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Figure 17.5. Lead use rate (grams/gallon). (Sources: Lead use: US Bu-
reau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, var. vols.; fuel consumption: US Federal 
Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, var. vols.) 
There are two straightforward methodologies for estimating the octane-
added, as defined above. Both start from the average octane level of fuel sold 
in a given year (see Figure 17.3). One approach is to use a lead susceptibility 
chart prepared by the Ethyl Corporation to determine the octane gain from 
a given amount of lead additive, based on the octane level of the base fuel, 
i.e., the gasoline as obtained from the refinery process alone. The chart 
in question is shown as Figure 17.6. It can be used to estimate the base 
fuel octane from the quantity of lead added (in grams per gallon). This 
method assumes, of course, that lead is added to average base fuel. In 
reality, high octane gasoline from some refineries has always been sold as 
unleaded premium, as long ago as the late 1930s.[4] This tends to lower the 
average octane level of the base fuel to which TEL was added, distorting the 
average picture somewhat. 
On the other hand, the alternative approach - which can be termed 
"process accounting" - is to calculate the average octane of the base fuel 
from the fraction of gasoline produced by each refinery process in each year 
and the octane produced by that process. For purposes of this analysis 
we have assumed the octane levels indicated in Table 17.1, namely, Burton 
batch thermal cracking (55 RON), continuous thermal cracking (73 RON), 
Houdry batch catalytic (87 RON), continuous catalytic or fluidic (95 RON). 
444 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior 
Typical U.S. 
(R + M)/2 D.N. 
95 
..... 
..... 
...... 
-
..... 
-
90 
-
..... ..... ..,-
- -
...... .... 
..,-
-
85 
v ...... 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.53 .0 4 .0 5 .06.0 
Antiknock content , grams metallic lead per gallon 
Figure 17.6. Ethyl Corporation lead alkyl antiknock susceptibility chart. 
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Here there are three difficulties. The first is the same as the one noted 
above, viz., some high octane refinery products fuels have been sold directly 
as lead-free premium gasoline without added lead. The second problem is 
that the average octane number associated with each process is only approx-
imate. Moreover, apart from the four main types of cracking process, refin-
ers have had, since the 1930s, a variety of other octane-enhancing processes 
available, including hydrogenation, polymerization, alkylation, hydrogen re-
forming and catalytic reforming. In fact, each refinery is unique in its mix of 
processes and products. The third problem is that we do not have published 
data on production by process, but only on capacity by process. On the 
average, over a long period of time, the two probably track together roughly, 
but on a year-to-year basis there are likely to be significant variations as 
some types of capacity are more highly utilized than others.[5] Apart from 
wartime distortions, during the early years of penetration of a new process 
one might expect some debugging troubles to reduce capacity utilization; 
this is the pattern observed in other cases of new process introduction. By 
contrast, in the late stages of a displacement, a refiner might keep an old 
depreciated plant on-stream and available, but operating at a low level just 
in case of a sudden upsurge in demand. Thus, one would tend to expect 
capacity utilization levels for a new process technology to start at moderate 
levels, rising gradually due to learning by doing until fairly late in the life of 
that technology, before dropping to rather low levels immediately prior to 
being phased out. 
For the several reasons given above, the two ways of estimating base 
fuel octane levels would not be expected to agree exactly. Of the two, the 
lead susceptibility method would appear to be more reliable. In fact, the 
agreement between the two methods is not remarkably close (Table 17.2). 
U sing both methods of calculating refinery octane, the share of added octane 
attributable to refining technology versus that attributable to the addition 
of TEL is plotted in Figure 17.7. The results are very interesting, especially 
when the lead susceptibility chart is used to calculate base octane level. 
Starting in the late 1920s, the TEL share began to rise rapidly (except for the 
single relapse in 1932) to the 50% level, or more, which it held throughout 
the 1930s and even increased to a peak of 66% in the war year of 1944. 
Thereafter the TEL share began to drop, falling to 36% in 1950, with a 
slight pickup to 40% in 1953, followed by a further fall to a low point of 17% 
in 1963. Yet it rebounded once again to the 32% level in 1967. 
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Table 17.2. Refinery and actual octane plus additive share. 
Addi- Addi- Addi-
Refinery Refinery Refinery Actual Actual tive tive tive 
octanea octaneb octaneC octane octaneC sharea shareb sharec 
1930 64.0 60.50 67.5 0.200 0.400 
1931 63.5 60.88 67.0 0.206 0.360 
1932 69.0 61.00 72.0 0.136 0.500 
1933 63.5 61.25 72.0 0.386 0.489 
1934 60.0 61.50 72.5 0.556 0.489 
1935 60.0 61.75 72.5 0.556 0.478 
1936 60.0 61.88 73.0 0.565 0.483 
1937 60.0 62.00 75.0 0.600 0.520 
1938 63.0 62.13 77.0 0.519 0.551 
1939 63.0 62.38 77.0 0.519 0.541 
1940 62.0 62.63 77.0 0.556 0.532 
1941 63.0 62.75 78.2 0.539 0.548 
1942 63.0 63.00 79.2 0.555 0.555 
1943 63.0 63.38 81.5 0.587 0.575 
1944 60.0 65.75 79.6 0.662 0.468 
1945 61.0 66.98 79.5 0.627 0.424 
1946 68.0 67.75 82.7 0.450 0.457 
1948 66.5 68.25 82.5 0.492 0.438 
1949 69.0 69.00 83.8 0.438 0.438 
1950 74.0 70.25 85.88 0.331 0.436 
1951 73.0 71.00 85.95 0.360 0.416 
1952 73.0 71.75 86.75 0.374 0.408 
1953 73.0 74.25 87.50 0.387 0.353 
1957 82.0 79.75 92.20 0.242 0.295 
1958 83.0 80.38 93.45 0.241 0.301 
1959 85.0 80.82 94.00 0.205 0.300 
1962 87.0 82.13 94.90 0.176 0.284 
1963 87.0 82.50 95.10 0.180 0.279 
1966 81.0 83.75 95.65 0.321 0.261 
1967 81.0 83.50 84.1 95.83 92.25 0.324 0.269 0.193 
1970 84.6 92.25 0.181 
1975 85.4 90.63 0.129 
1978 85.8 90.00 0.105 
1979 86.0 89.60 0.091 
1980 86.2 88.72 0.065 
1981 86.3 88.60 0.060 
1982 86.5 88.50 0.052 
1983 86.6 88.55 0.051 
1984 86.7 88.60 0.049 
1985 86.7 88.50 0.047 
1986 86.7 88.67 0.051 
1987 86.8 88.61 0.047 
aMethod 1. bMethod 2. CExtended series. 
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17.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
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1990 
How can this behavior be explained at all, still less fitted into the conven-
tional substitution picture? As noted earlier, one normally expects the supe-
rior technology to gradually displace the inferior one, following an S-curve 
or some similar path. In the present case, TEL became dominant rather soon 
after its introduction, but did not replace cracking, or even slow down its rate 
of adoption. In fact, since the 1940s the trend has been the other way. TEL 
has subsequently been displaced very largely by more advanced cracking and 
other refining technologies and new additives (Figure 17.8). This trend was 
well advanced even before the environmental regulations restricting the use 
of TEL. 
On the other hand, neither of the alternatives has ever entirely displaced 
the other. Even as TEL was phased out, other octane-enhancing additives 
have begun to replace it (Figure 17.8, Table 17.3). If there are economies 
of scale or economies of adoption favoring lock-in to either approach, e.g., 
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Figure 17.8. Percentage contribution of different additives. 
Arthur (1988a), they are evidently compensated for by diseconomies (de-
clining marginal returns), possibly associated with high-severity petroleum 
refining. No matter how sophisticated the refinery technology, it is appar-
ently always economical (in the narrow sense) to gain additional octane by 
the addition of some TEL, or one of the alcohols. By the same token, there 
are also declining marginal returns to the use of TEL, or other additives, 
beyond a certain point. Thus the two technologies, while somewhat compet-
itive, are also to some extent complementary. 
Apart from the issue of complementarity, noted above, it is important 
also to observe that one of the two technologies, cracking, was evolving 
rapidly while the other remained static until regulation forced a change. In 
fact TEL is one of the few examples of a technology which essentially did 
not evolve at all after introduction. Its diffusion process was therefore pure, 
and not the more commonplace combination of technological change and 
diffusion together. Are there other cases like this one? Quite certainly there 
are, inasmuch as declining marginal returns and complementarity are not 
rare phenomena in economics.[6] 
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Table 17.3. Percentage contribution of different additives. 
TBA plus 
TEL Toluene Ethanol TBA Methanola MTBE 
1967 100.0 
1970 100.0 
1975 97.3 2.7 
1978 91.4 3.8" 1.0 
1979 89.2 7.2 0.4 2.5 0.1 0.6 
1980 86.3 6.8 1.2 2.5 0.8 2.5 
1981 76.8 9.3 2.2 3.7 3.1 4.9 
1982 74.9 6.9 6.0 2.5 4.0 5.7 
1983 71.0 6.6 10.9 1.8 3.0 6.6 
1984 65.1 7.2 15.5 1.0 3.3 7.9 
1985 57.8 7.3 22.5 0.3 1.4 10.7 
1986 17.6 12.0 41.2 29.2 
1987 12.2 9.4 36.1 42.2 
aFor methanol, add (TBA plus methanol) to MTBE. 
bMethyl manganese tricasbonyl (MMT) accounted for 3.8% (or 44% of additives used in 
unleaded gasoline in 1978). MMT was banned in 1978 by the EPA. 
Notes 
[1] In fact, for two early Pennsylvania refineries for which data is available -
Pratt's and Downer's - the gasoline output was only 1.5% of the output stream 
(Williamson and Daum, 1959). 
[2] Indiana Standard had oil wells in Indiana and Illinois, but the reserves were not 
large. The breakup of Jersey Standard left the parent company in possession of 
Humble Oil Co., with its large Texas crude oil reserves. 
[3] Kettering was inspired by the red-green natural dyes in plants, such as the trail-
ing arbutus, and an apparent relationship between leaf color and early blooming 
(Raymond, 1980). 
[4] For instance, premium Sunoco "Blue" was made directly from the Houdry cat-
alytic process; in the 1960s Amoco sold a premium lead-free gasoline of very 
high octane. 
[5] During World War II this distorted the picture significantly, inasmuch as the 
demand for high octane aviation gasoline soared, soaking up virtually all of the 
refinery capacity for catalytic cracking. As a consequence, old thermal cracking 
plants were kept in service and the base octane level of fuels used by the civilian 
sector declined sharply. It was made up, in part, by extraordinarily high use of 
TEL, as shown in Figure 17.5. 
[6] Another fairly obvious example is the complementarity between the basic oxygen 
furnace (BOF) and the electric arc furnace (EAF) in steel-making. The one 
converts pig iron from ore and scrap, but the other converts scrap only. The 
450 Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior 
balance between them depends on the scrap supply. On reflection, it must be 
clear that every coproduct relationship corresponds to some complementarity. 
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